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BRIGGS v. GOODWIN: CALLING FOR A REAPPRAISAL
OF PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY FROM CONSTITU-
TIONAL TORTS
The doctrine of sovereign immunity frequently denies redress to a
victim of governmental tortious conduct,' and a corresponding im-
munity accorded the governmental official himself may foreclose re-
lief through an action at law against the officer.2 The freedom of the
1. Unless the governmental entity had waived its immunity, historically it
could not be sued by an aggrieved party. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 131 (4th ed. 1971); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS
§§ 29.2-.4, at 1609-18 (1956). In the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28
U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), the federal government assumed
liability in tort "to the same extent as a private individual." Id. § 2674. This
waiver of immunity, however, is subject to the exceptions enumerated in § 2680
of the Act, which denies liability for, inter alia, any claim based on a discretionary
function of a federal employee, id. § 2608 (a), and any claim arising from an
intentional tort. Id. § 2680 (h). In 1974 Congress amended § 2680 (h) to permit
suits against the government for claims arising out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution by federal
investigative or law enforcement officers. Act of March 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (Supp. V 1975)). The
amendment may limit the officer's liability in an action brought on a theory of
deprivation of constitutional rights that was first recognized in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in-
asmuch as the Court's recognition of the "Bivens tort" may be attributable to a
lack of alternative remedies. Id. at 409-10 (Harlan, J., concurring) ; see note 18
infra. The ultimate ramifications of the amendment, however, are beyond the
scope of this Comment.
2. As indicated by the comment of one author that "every official, from the
Prime Minister down to a constable or a collector of taxes, is under the same
responsibility for every act done without legal justification as any other citizen,"
A. DicEy, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 193 (10th ed. 1959), the Anglo-Ameri-
can system of law traditionally did not immunize a public officer from suit. James,
Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 610,
635 (1955). Nevertheless, some official immunity was known at common law.
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 209, 215-18 (1963). Federal case law demonstrates that, although a suit in
equity may be brought against a public official, see, e.g., Sterling v. Constatin,
287 U.S. 378 (1932), the official often may assert immunity to defeat an action
at law. See, e.g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896). In Barr v. Matteo, 360
U.S. 564 (1959), the Supreme Court held that a federal official was absolutely
immune for discretionary actions taken "within the outer perimeter of [the]
line of duty." Id. at 575..See generally Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative
Officers, 21 MINN. L. REv. 263 (1937).
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government attorney or prosecutor l from suit for the common law
torts of malicious prosecution 4 and defamation 5 typifies the protec-
tion provided by the doctrine of official immunity from actions for
injuries inflicted while performing discretionary duties within the
scope of the official's employment.
Whether Congress, in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1871,6 in-
tended that officials could assert this immunity to defeat suits alleging
the deprivation of constitutional rights is questionable. Section 1983
of the Act as codified, which provides for a cause of action against
"[e]very person" who under color of state law deprives another of
constitutionally guaranteed rights,7 appears to hold all officials liable,
3. This Comment will use the term "prosecutor" to refer to an official whose
duties involve the prosecution of criminal proceedings on behalf of the govern-
ment.
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 656 (1977) provides: "A public prose-
cutor acting in his official capacity is absolutely privileged to initiate, institute,
or continue criminal proceedings." See, e.g., Flood v. Harrington, 532 F.2d 1248
(9th Cir. 1976) (federal prosecutors absolutely immune from action for malicious
prosecution); Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1975) (quasi-
judicial immunity protects assistant district attorney for acts performed within
his authority) ; Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 949 (1950) (Attorneys General of United States absolutely immune from
charges of false arrest).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1977) provides:
An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory
matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a pro-
posed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course
and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates as
counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding.
This privilege is not limited to prosecutors but is available to all attorneys. Id.
§ 586, Comment b ("It protects a prosecuting attorney as well as a defense
attorney in a criminal action."). See Romens v. Prince, 85 N.M. 474, 513 P.2d
717 (1973) (private attorney immune from suit based on allegedly libelous letter
concerning estate settlement) ; Friedman v. Knecht, 248 Cal. App. 2d 455, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 540 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (prosecuting attorney immune from libel);
Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P.2d 1127 (1938) (defense attorney in criminal
prosecution not liable for statements about witness made in argument to jury).
See generally Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings,
9 COLUM. L. REV. 463 (1909).
6. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (now codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1985-1986 (1970)).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the




thus restricting official immunity to common law torts.8 Nevertheless,
courts have declined to construe section 1983 literally; instead, they
have held many of the immunities enjoyed by officials at common
law applicable to actions for alleged deprivations of constitutional
rights. For example, legislative and judicial officials' absolute im-
munity from common law civil actions was extended to actions for
damages under section 1983.9 Members of the executive branch, how-
ever, received only a qualified immunity from section 1983 actions.
Consequently, they must litigate a suit brought under the Act but
may assert the affirmative defense of good faith and reasonable
belief.'0
Imbler v. Pachtmacn," set forth the United States Supreme Court's
initial delineation of a prosecuting attorney's immunity from a suit
alleging the deprivation of constitutional rights. The Court recog-
nized the hybrid nature of the prosecutor's office 12 by distinguishing
his executive roles of investigator and administrator from his quasi-
judicial 13 role of advocate. The Court then held that a prosecuting
attorney, "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's
case," is absolutely immune from liability under a section 1983
action.14
8. In his dissenting opinion in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), which
awarded absolute immunity to a judge for a suit brought under § 1983, Justice
Douglas observed that "[t]o most, 'every person' would mean every person, not
every person except judges." Id. at 559. Accord, Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1947); see Comment,
Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Liability of Judicial Officers].
9. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judge); Tenney v. Brand-
hove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislator).
10. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), in which the Court
stated: "It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the
time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that
affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in
the course of official conduct." Id. at 247-48.
Although an absolute immunity defeats a suit at its outset, a qualified im-
munity affords an official with an affirmative defense. See Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 316-22 (1975);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1974).
11. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
12. Id. at 430-31.
13. Pertaining to governmental immunity, the term "quasi-judicial" initially
was synonymous with "discretionary" and thus indicative of conduct on which no
cause of action could be maintained. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 1, §
29.10, at 1638-39. Subsequently, the term referred to those officers whose duties
aligned them more closely with the judicial process than with the executive
branch. See, e.g., Watts v. Gerking, 111 Ore. 641, 228 P. 135 (1924).
14. 424 U.S. at 431.
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Imbler appeared to affirm the prevailing view of the extent of a
prosecutor's immunity from actions alleging deprivations of civil
rights,15 and presented no interpretative difficulties 16 until the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided Briggs v.
Goodwin 17 in 1977. In Briggs a Special Attorney of the United States
15. See, e.g., Tyler v. Witkowski, 511 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1975) (absolute
immunity to assistant state's attorney from civil liability under Civil Rights
Act of 1871 for actions within scope of prosecutor's normal function of determin-
ing whether to cease prosecution); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (qualified immunity to United States Attorney General against Bivens-type
actions based on police-investigatory activity) ; Weathers v. Ebert, 505 F.2d 514
(4th Cir. 1974) (absolute immunity from Civil Rights Act suit to district attorney
for actions within proper scope of prosecutorial capacity when procuring indict-
ment against plaintiff); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1974) (no
absolute immunity to district attorney acting in investigatory, rather than quasi-
judicial, capacity while obtaining illegal search warrants) ; Hampton v. City of
Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974) (qualified
immunity for state's attorney for illegal search and entry) ; Littleton v. Berbling,
468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1143 (1974) (no absolute
immunity to state's attorney for acts exceeding scope of official capacity) ; Bethea
v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972) (abso-
lute immunity against Bivens-type suit to Assistant United States Attorney for
acts pertaining to judicial process) ; Wilhelm v. Turner, 431 F.2d 177 (8th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971) (qualified immunity to state attorney
general from § 1983 suit for investigative activities) ; Madison v. Purdy, 410
F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1969) (qualified immunity to prosecutor for investigatory
activity exceeding scope of jurisdiction and lacking authority of law) ; Marlowe
v. Coakley, 404 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969)
(absolute immunity to district attorney for trial work) ; Dodd v. Spokane County,
393 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1968) (qualified immunity to prosecuting attorney for
investigative activity) ; Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965) (no
absolute immunity to county attorney for coercing confession) ; Lewis v. Brauti-
gain, 227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955) (no absolute immunity to state's attorney for
coercing guilty plea); Ames v. Vavreck, 356 F. Supp. 931 (D. Minn. 1973)
(qualified immunity to city attorney for police-investigatory activity) ; Balistrieri
v. Warren, 314 F. Supp. 824 (W.D. Wis. 1970) (qualified immunity to state at-
torney for investigatory activity) ; Peterson v. Stanczak, 48 F.R.D. 426 (N.D. Ill.
1969) (no absolute immunity to state's attorney for police activity).
16. See, e.g., Helstoski v. Goldstein, 552 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1977) (qualified
immunity at most for United States Attorney who participated in illegal search
and seizure); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1976) (absolute im-
munity for federal prosecutor who used perjured testimony and concealed excul-
patory evidence at trial); Tomko v. Lees, 416 F. Supp. 1137 (W.D. Pa. 1976)
(no absolute immunity for prosecutor who coerced plaintiff to act as informant) ;
Tate v. Grose, 412 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (absolute immunity for prosecu-
tor who used perjured testimony at trial); cf. Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp.
1282 (D.D.C. 1976) (qualified immunity for corporation counsel who gave
opinion to police regarding constitutionality of regulations).
17. 569 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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who allegedly infringed the defendant's constitutional rights by per-
juring himself at a hearing related to a grand jury proceeding,
claimed absolute prosecutorial immunity in support of his motion to
dismiss.'8 In an opinion that inadequately outlined the distinction be-
18. Because the prosecutor in Briggs was a Special Attorney of the United
States acting pursuant to federal law, § 1983, which provides a cause of action
for the deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law, is inapplica-
ble. Rather, Briggs involved a type of action first recognized in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in
which the Court sustained a claim for damages against federal agents who made
a warrantless entry of plaintiff's apartment, an unconstitutional search, and an
illegal arrest. Id. at 397. The plaintiff in Briggs asserted that he had been denied
his fifth amendment guarantee of due process and sixth amendment right to
counsel. The Court, however, has not decided whether Bivens established a cause
of action for a deprivation of any constitutional right, or whether it is restricted
to fourth amendment violations. Compare, e.g., Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862
(3d Cir. 1975) (action for first amendment violation) ; States Marine Lines, Inc.
v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974) (action for fifth amendment violation) ;
United States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972) (action for
fifth amendment violation); Gardels v. Murphy, 377 F. Supp. 1389 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (action for first, fourth, and fifth amendment violations); Butler v.
United States, 365 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Hawaii 1973) (action for first amendment
violation) with, e.g., Moore v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 163 (D. Colo. 1974)
(first amendment claim dismissed); Davidson v. Kane, 337 F. Supp. 922 (E.D.
Va. 1972) (fifth amendment claim dismissed). See generally Hill, Constitutional
Remedies, 69 COLuM. L. REv. 1109 (1969).
If Briggs states a valid cause of action under Bivens, the standard of im-
munity available under § 1983 suits also should be applicable. See, e.g., Economou
v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688, 695 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
granted sub nom. Butz v. Economou, 429 U.S. 1089 (1977) (argument heard
November 7, 1977) ; Mark v. Groff, 521 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1975) ; Fidtler
v. Rundle, 497 F.2d 794, 798 (3d Cir. 1974). See also Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d
83 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (complaint against Justice Department officials filed as § 1983
action but pursued under Bivens theory).
One commentator has suggested that the 1974 amendment to the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) establishing governmental liability for intentional torts,
see note 1 supra, may have eclipsed the Bivens cause of action for fourth amend-
ment violations because Bivens was predicated partially on the lack of an effective
alternative remedy. Comment, Economou v. United States Department of Agri-
culture: Blurring the Distinctions Between Constitutional and Common Law
Tort Immunity, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 628, 638-39 n.67 (c) (1977). The FTCA,
however, confines governmental liability for intentional torts to those committed
by law enforcement officers authorized to perform searches, to seize evidence, or
to make arrests. 28 U.S.C. 2860(h) (Supp. V 1975). Consequently, an illegal
search conducted by a federal prosecutor imposes no liability on the government
because the act is not within a prosecutor's statutorily authorized duties. 28
U.S.C. § 547 (1970). The intrusion nevertheless would be under "color of law,"
see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961), thus necessitating a Bivens-type
action to ensure a remedy for such fourth amendment violations. See, e.g., Hel-
stoski v. Goldstein, 552 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1977) (illegal seizure of bank records
1977]
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tween the investigatory and the quasi-judicial roles of a prosecutor,
the court of appeals affirmed the district court's denial of absolute
immunity.19 The court reasoned that the defendant was entitled only
to qualified immunity because the alleged deprivation occurred while
the prosecutor was engaged in the investigatory activity of a grand
jury proceeding.2 0
Imbler therefore failed to dispel the confusion arising from the
various rationales for granting prosecutors immunity from consti-
tutional tort liability.21 Indeed, Briggs reveals not only that the Court
in Imbler failed to delineate precisely the scope of a prosecutor's im-
munity but also that Imbler's application could produce an incon-
sistent body of law. This Comment suggests that Briggs reached the
right result for the wrong reasons, correctly according the perjurious
prosecutor a qualified immunity through an incorrect analysis of the
Supreme Court's decision in Imbler. Furthermore, because the Imbler
rubric generally is overinclusive, the Comment proposes a narrow
reading of that case as granting absolute prosecutorial immunity from
constitutional tort liability only for the actual initiation of a prosecu-
tion and the affirmative presentation of evidence. 22
EVOLUTION OF THE PROSECUTOR'S IMMUNITY
FROM CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS
Common Law Development
Similar to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the immunity avail-
able to judicial officials derives from English common law; 23 in 1607
by United States Attorney) ; Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972) (illegal search and seizure by Assistant United
States Attorney); Burkhart v. Saxbe, 397 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (war-
rantless electronic surveillance by unnamed agents of Justice Department).
19. 569 F.2d at 29.
20. Id. at 26.
21. Absolute immunity from constitutional torts has been awarded a prosecut-
ing attorney as a judicial officer, see, e.g., Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967), as a quasi-judicial official, see, e.g.,
Wilhelm v. Turner, 431 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 947
(1971) as an advocate, see, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 790 (E.D.
N.Y. 1972), and for activities both within the scope of his official duties, see,
e.g., Tyler v. Witkowski, 511 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1975), and within the scope of
his authority, see, e.g., Madison v. Purdy, 410 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1969); Lewis
v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955).
22. See notes 99-108 infra & accompanying text.
23. See Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 535-36 (1869); Yates v.
Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810), aff'd, 9 Johns. 395 (N.Y. 1811);
Jaffe, supra note 2, at 215-18. Contra, James, supra note 2, at 635.
[Vol. 19:375
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the King's Bench granted a judge immunity from civil damage suits.24
Two hundred and sixty years later, the Supreme Court in Randall v.
Brigham 25 sanctioned the doctrine of judicial immunity, albeit in
somewhat cautious terms.2 Suggesting a limitation on the grant of
immunity, the Court held that judges "are not liable to civil actions for
their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdic-
tion, unless perhaps where the acts, in excess of jurisdiction, are done
maliciously or corruptly." 27 In 1872, however, the Court dismissed
this qualification in Bradley v. Fisher,2 adopting the English rule
which granted absolute immunity regardless of motive.2 9 In both
Bradley3 0 and Randall 3l the Court's extension of immunity helped
to preserve the independence of the judiciary by ensuring that judges
could act without fear of personal consequences.
The degree of immunity accorded a prosecuting attorney historically
has paralleled that granted a judge.3 2 In Yaselli v. Goff 33 a malicious
prosecution action was brought against an Assistant United States
Attorney who allegedly used false evidence to procure the plaintiff's
indictment. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that
many of the considerations supporting a grant of absolute judicial
immunity, including the threat of harassment by unfounded litigation
and the possibility of decisions influenced by a fear of potential
liability, also applied to prosecuting attorneys.34 Noting that the
24. Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (K.B. 1607).
25. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1869).
26. Id. at 536. An earlier state court decision had recognized absolute judicial
immunity. Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (Kent, C.J.),
aff'd, 9 Johns. 355 (N.Y. 1811).
27. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 536 (emphasis supplied). In determining whether an
official may claim immunity, acts within the scope of the official's subject matter
jurisdiction but in excess of his powers must be distinguished from extra-
jurisdictional actions, which are wholly unrelated to the official's duties and out-
side his authority. W. PROSSER, supra, note 1, § 132, at 991. Although the former
actions are included within a grant of immunity, officials are liable for the latter.
See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
28. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
29. Id. at 347.
30. Id.
31. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 536.
32. See, e.g., Kostal v. Stoner, 292 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 868 (1962); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd per curiam,
275 U.S. 503 (1927); Kittler v. Kelsch, 56 N.D. 227, 216 N.W. 898 (1927); Watts
v. Gerking, 111 Ore. 655, 228 P. 135 (1924). See also Note, The Proper Scope of
the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARV. L. Ruv. 1285, 1297-99 (1953); 12 MiNN. L. REV.
665 (1928).
33. 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd per curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
34. Id. at 404.
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prosecutor must exercise discretion in a manner similar to that of a
judge, the court referred to the Assistant United States Attorney as
"at least a quasi judicial officer" 35 and concluded that the prosecutor
should receive immunity identical to that accorded the judiciary.3 6 Be-
cause criminal sanctions were available to prevent an abuse of prose-
cutorial power, the court believed that an extension of immunity
would not deter the prosecutor's conscientious performance of his
duties.37
Gregoire v. Biddle,3s an action for false arrest against United States
Attorneys General, echoed the result in Yaselli. Writing for the Second
Circuit, Judge Learned Hand determined that a prosecutor was abso-
lutely immune from a suit at common law for acts within the scope of
his powers. Although the immunity would "leave unredressed the
wrongs done by dishonest officers," the court favored this result over
one that would "subject those who try to do their duty to the constant
dread of retaliation." 31 At common law, then, prosecuting attorneys
enjoyed the same degree of immunity from damage suits as did judges.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 406.
37. Id. at 404. A criminal analogue to § 1983 is provided by 18 U.S.C. § 242
(1970), which states:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or
District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such in-
habitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are
prescribed for the punishment of citizens shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death
results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for
life.
The court opined in Yaselli that, in the performance of his duty, the prosecutor
owes a duty to the public rather than to the individual who may have been
wronged by the official's actions. Any official excess, therefore, would be an injury
to the public that should be redressed through the offender's public prosecution
under a criminal statute such as § 242. 12 F.2d at 404. See also United States v.
Anzelmo, 319 F. Supp. 1106, 1118 (E.D. La. 1970). The Supreme Court in
Imbler acknowledged that § 242 and ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC7-13 serve as deterrents to prosecutorial misconduct in cases in which the
prosecutor is immune from civil suit. 424 U.S. at 429.
38. 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
39. Id. at 581. In Gregoire Judge Hand presented his rationale for granting
absolute official immunity:
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact
guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any
other personal motive not connected with the public good, should not
escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were
[Vol. 19:375
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Prosecutorial Immunity Under the Civil Rights Act
As with all common law immunities, that given a prosecuting at-
torney is susceptible to legislative abrogation. Indeed, a literal reading
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which states that every person who
causes a constitutional violation shall be liable to the party injured,
suggests that Congress intended to eliminate existing common law
immunities in actions brought under the statute.40 One court adopted
this construction, refusing to grant a prosecuting attorney inmumity
from section 1983 suits. 41 Such a broad interpretation, however, has
received minimal support.42
The Supreme Court first considered the extent of official immunity
from section 1983 actions in Tenney v. Brandhove,43 a 1951 decision
involving a suit against a state legislator. Although observing that
the Constitution's speech and debate clause mandates a federal legis-
lator's immunity 44 and that most state constitutions grant immunity
to state legislators, 45 the Court based its recognition of absolute im-
munity primarily on legislative intent. The Court concluded that,
absent a specific abrogation of the existing common law immunities,
they would continue to apply to actions brought under section 1983.46
possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would
be monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing so is that it
is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the
case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as
well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable
danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of
their duties.
Id.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). For the text of § 1983 see note 7 supra. After
reviewing the legislative debates on the Act, one commentator concluded that
Congress intended to include judicial officers within the statute's provisions.
Liability of Judicial Officers, supra note 8, at 327-28. See generally Littleton v.
Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 397-403 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1143
(1974); notes 6-8 supra & accompanying text.
41. Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 776 (1947). As to this issue Picking was an anomaly and was expressly
overruled in Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1021 (1967).
42. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
43. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1, states in pertinent part: "[F]or any Speech
or Debate in either House, [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be
questioned in any other Place."
45. 341 U.S. at 372-75.
46. Id. at 376.
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Sixteen years later, in Pierson v. Ray 47 the Court, relying on Tenney,
exempted judges from suit under section 1983. Failing to acknowledge
the constitutional underpinning of Tenney, the Court in Pierson stated
only that absolute judicial immunity, which was entrenched in the
common law, had not been specificially eliminated by Congress.48
Not all immunities existing at common law, however, survived the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 9 the Su-
preme Court held that high-ranking executive officials sued under the
Act enjoyed only a qualified immunity, requiring a showing of good
faith and reasonable belief.50 Because the office of federal prosecutor
is part of the executive branch of government, 51 Scheuer left uncer-
tain whether the level of prosecutorial immunity, which traditionally
was commensurate with that of the judiciary, had been altered in
suits brought pursuant to the Act.
Imbler v. Pachtman
In Imbler v. Pachtman 52 the Supreme Court first considered the
immunity of a prosecuting attorney from liability for constitutional
torts. The felony murder prosecution of Paul Imbler by California's
Deputy District Attorney Richard Pachtman formed the factual basis
for Imbler's section 1983 suit against the prosecutor. Pachtman had
decided to prosecute Imbler and subsequently had obtained his con-
viction largely on the identification testimony of three witnesses.
After the trial, Pachtman apprised the Governor of newly discovered
evidence that tended to impeach the witnesses and to exonerate Imbler.
On the basis of this new evidence Imbler unsuccessfully sought a writ
of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of California.53 In a second
47. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
48. 386 U.S. at 553-55. The unsound premise on which Pierson was decided is
discussed in Liability of Judicial Officers, supra note 8. The commentator observes
that the Congress of 1871 was familiar only with the qualified immunity recog-
nized by the Court in Randall, see text accompanying notes 25-27 supra, and not
with the absolute immunity granted in Bradley, see text accompanying notes 28-
30 supra, because that case was decided subsequent to the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act. Liability of Judicial Officers, supra note 8, at 325-27.
49. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
50. Id. at 247-48. For a discussion of the distinction between absolute and
qualified immunity see note 10 supra & accompanying text.
51. See 28 U.S.C. § 501 (1970); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECU-
TION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, THE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 1.1
(a) (1971).
52. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
53. In re Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 387 P.2d 6, 35 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 908 (1964).
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petition, the court overturned Imbler's death sentence, 54 determining
that a prejudicial jury instruction had been given at the trial.5 5 Rather
than resentence Imbler, the State stipulated to a sentence of life im-
prisonment.56 Thereafter, the federal district court granted a writ of
habeas corpus to Imbler, finding eight instances of misconduct by the
state prosecutor at the original trial.57 Deciding against retrial, Cali-
fornia then released Imbler.58
In his civil suit against Pachtman, Imbler alleged that he had been
deprived of his constitutional rights through the prosecutor's use of
false testimony and suppression of exculpatory evidence at the crimi-
nal trial. The district court granted Pachtman's motion to dismiss,
stating that prosecuting attorneys repeatedly had been held immune
from civil actions for "acts done as part of their traditional official
function." 59 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, affirming the lower court's
decision, stated that Pachtman's alleged acts were committed "during
prosecutorial activities which can only be characterized as an 'integral
part of the judicial process.' "60 The Supreme Court then granted
certiorari to consider the issue of prosecutorial liability under section
1983.61
Noting that the purpose of the immunity is to ensure the effective
functioning of the judicial system, the Court determined that the
public, not the officer, is the intended beneficiary of the privilege.0 2
Without the immunity, a judicial officer, to avoid becoming the target
of suits, could tend to "shade his decisions instead of exercising the
independence of judgment required by his public trust." 63 Because the
54. Imbler had been convicted on two counts: murder in the first degree and
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit murder, and he received a
sentence of death on the first count and a sentence of imprisonment not to exceed
ten years on the second count. See Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795, 797 (C.D.
Cal. 1968), aff'd per curiam sub nor. Imbler v. California, 424 F.2d 631 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970). The California Supreme Court affirmed
the convictions on an automatic appeal. People v. Imbler, 57 Cal. 2d 711, 371 P.2d
304, 21 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1962).
55. In re Imbler, 61 Cal. 2d 544, 393 P.2d 687, 39 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1964).
56. 424 U.S. at 414.
57. Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795, 809-11 (C.D. Cal. 1968), a.'d per
curiam sub nom. Imbler v. California, 424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 865 (1970).
58. 424 U.S. at 415.
59. Imbler v. Pachtman, 500 F.2d 1301, 1302 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 424 U.S.
409 (1976).
60. 500 F.2d at 302.
61. 424 U.S. at 417.
62. Id. at 424-25, 427.
63. Id. at 423.
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threat of retaliatory litigation 14 does not diminish merely because the
basis for an action is section 1983 rather than common law, the Court
concluded that absolute immunity should be extended in suits brought
under that provision. 5
The Court also distinguished between a prosecutor's quasi-judicial
and his administrative or investigatory capacities. Because law en-
forcement officers, such as policemen, received only a qualified im-
munity from section 1983 suits, 6 a prosecutor logically should be pro-
vided with no greater immunity for his investigative activities. Never-
theless, after granting absolute immunity to a prosecutor's quasi-
judicial activities, which are "intimately associated with the judicial
phase of the criminal process," 67 the Court refused to consider the
extent of immunity applicable to the officer's investigatory and ad-
ministrative actions.6 8 In affirming the lower courts' dismissal of the
complaint against prosecutor Pachtman, the Court noted the limita-
tions of its opinion: it held that, "in initiating a prosecution and in
presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from civil suit
for damages under section 1983." 69
BRIGGS V. GOODWIN
The Factual Situation in Briggs
The Court in Imbler recognized that "[d]rawing a proper line
between [administrative or investigatory and quasi-judicial] func-
tions may present difficult questions." 70 This problem arose in
64. Other considerations prompting the Court to uphold the grant of absolute
immunity included: the concern that a prosecutor, cognizant of potential personal
liability, would refrain from initiating or presenting cases in the best interests
of the state; the fear that qualified immunity would hinder not only the prosecu-
tor's decision-making but also the performance of his other duties because he
might be unavailable while participating as a defendant in suits; the imprac-
ticability of litigating a § 1983 action, which would require a virtual retrial of
the criminal case; the recognition that a prosecutor acts under constraints of
time and information; and the concern that the focus of post-trial procedures,
such as appellate review and post-conviction remedies, would become oriented
to protect the prosecutor. Id. at 424-28. In his concurring opinion Justice White
argued that these considerations, inherent in all suits against state officials, are
insufficient to award absolute immunity. Id. at 436-37.
65. Id. at 424-28.
66. Id. at 430, citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
67. Id. at 430.
68. Id. at 430 & 431 n.33.
69. Id. at 431.
70. Id. at 431 n.33.
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Briggs v. Goodwin: 71 the defendant Goodwin, who had been appointed
Special Attorney to the United States Attorney General to investigate
violations of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,72 subpoenaed
more than twenty members of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War-
Winter Soldiers Organization (VVAW-WSO) to appear before a
federal grand jury. Suspecting infiltration of the group by members
of the police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, counsel for the
individuals who had received subpoenas filed a motion with the dis-
trict court requesting that Goodwin and his associates be required to
disclose by affidavit the informants among those subpoenaed. The
court directed Goodwin to testify and asked him a single question:
"are any of witnesses represented by counsel agents or informants
of the United States of America ?" 73 After Goodwin replied in the
negative, the court excused him without providing the counsel for the
VVAW-WSO members an opportunity for cross-examination.
Together with seven others who were subpoenaed at various times,
appellee Briggs was indicted pursuant to the Jencks Acts.74 Subse-
quently, the "Gainesville Eight," as they were known collectively,
received materials revealing that an informer, Emerson Poe, had
been working with the FBI even before the commencement of Good-
win's investigation. Although the court permitted Poe to testify at the
trial, the appellees were acquitted of all charges.
The appellees subsequently filed a civil action, seeking recovery
on a "Bivens" theory for a constitutional tort committed by a
federal officer.7 5 The complaint alleged that the appellees had been
deprived of their fifth amendment guarantee of due process and sixth
amendment right to counsel by Goodwin's perjury at the hearing held
in conjunction with the grand jury proceeding; it sought relief both
in equity 76 and at law.
'71. 569 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
72. Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 101-1212, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
73. 569 F.2d at 13.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
75. See note 18 supra.
76. Neither the district court nor the court of appeals specifically decided
whether the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity barred equitable relief.
The appellate court, although leaving the question for the district court because
the only issue on interlocutory appeal was the degree of immunity to be accorded
Goodwin, stated: "We believe it to be fairly clear that official immunity bears
only on the availability of a damages remedy, rather than prospective equitable
relief . . . ." 569 F.2d at 15 n.4.
The Supreme Court has not ruled expressly on the issue of official immunity
from suits seeking equitable relief. A number of decisions, however, have in-
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Goodwin moved to dismiss this complaint, invoking the doctrine of
absolute, quasi-judicial immunity. The District Court for the District
of Columbia denied his motion 77 but agreed to certify the issue of
prosecutorial immunity for interlocutory appeal 78 to the court of
appeals. Holding that a prosecuting attorney engaged in an in-
vestigatory activity enjoys only a qualified immunity from a civil suit
based on the deprivation of constitutional rights, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.7 9
Misapprehension of the Imbler Rule
The court in Briggs acknowledged the distinction, recognized in
Imbler, between the prosecutor's dual roles as an advocate and in-
vestigator. Thus, if Goodwin's actions were in a quasi-judicial capacity
as an advocate, he would be entitled to absolute immunity and dis-
dicated that the Court will grant such relief, despite the defendant's status as an
official entitled to immunity from damages. In 1908 the Court stated:
The various authorities . . . furnish ample justification for the
assertion that individuals who, as officers of the state, are clothed
with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the
state, and who threaten and are about to commence proceedings,
either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected
an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be
enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action.
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908) (denying habeas corpus petition
of Attorney General of Minnesota cited for contempt in disobeying federal
district court's injunction ordering him to refrain from prosecution of railroad
pursuant to state statute). The Court subsequently has limited the granting of
injunctive relief to special circumstances:
Ex parte Young . . . and following cases have established the
doctrine that when absolutely necessary for protection of constitu-
tional rights courts of the United States have power to enjoin state
officers from instituting criminal actions. But this may not be done
except under extraordinary circumstances where the danger of ir-
reparable loss is both great and immediate. Ordinarily, there should
be no interference with such officers; primarily, they are charged
with the duty of prosecuting offenders against the laws of the State
and must decide when and how this is to be done. The accused should
first set up and rely upon his defense in the state courts, even though
this involves the challenge of the validity of some statute, unless it
plainly appears that this course would not afford adequate protection.
Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926), quoted in Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 45 (1971). See Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
77. Briggs v. Goodwin, 384 F. Supp. 1228 (D.D.C. 1974).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970) permits interlocutory appeals of controlling
questions of law from the district court at the discretion of the court of appeals
if such action materially may advance the termination of the litigation.
79. 569 F.2d at 16-17, 29.
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missal of the complaint. If the prosecutor was performing in an in-
vestigatory capacity, however, he would have to answer the com-
plaint and could assert only a qualified immunity as an affirmative
defense.80
The court rejected the possibility that the setting of a prosecutor's
activity might be considered conclusive as to his role, emphasizing
that Goodwin was not entitled to absolute immunity merely because
his alleged conduct occurred in conjunction with a grand jury pro-
ceeding.8 ' To define the nature of the prosecutor's alleged misconduct,
the court first examined which of its two roles the grand jury was
performing: as an investigatory body, determining whether a crime
has occurred and identifying its likely perpetrator; or as a delibera-
tive body, deciding whether to return an indictment.82 Because Good-
win's alleged perjury occurred while the grand jury was acting in
the former capacity, the prosecutor's actions also were investigatory,
and thus entitled only to a qualified immunity.8 3
In addition, the court reasoned that the safeguards against prose-
cutorial misconduct it had enumerated in Apton v. Wilson 8 4 were
either ineffective or absent in Briggs. Goodwin's alleged misconduct
had not been made the subject of an official inquiry, despite the exist-
ence of criminal and professional penalties for misrepresentations
made under oath before a federal court.5 No jury had evaluated
80. Id. at 21.
81. Id. at 23.
82. Id. at 24.
83. Id. The court based its determination that the grand jury's function was
investigatory on several factors:
First, many more VYAW members were subpoenaed to appear before
the grand jury than were ever indicted. Second, the indictments
which the Government did obtain were returned despite the fact that
none of the VVAW members subpoenaed actually testified. Third,
appellee Briggs was subpoenaed a month after the original group of
subpoenas was issued, and Briggs and Michelson were indicted more
than three months after appellant's investigation began.
Id. To support its conclusion as to the grand jury's function, the court referred
to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.
1972), in which the court had determined that the same "grand jury was in-
vestigating alleged plans of the VAW to disrupt the Republican National Con-
vention . . . in violation of various criminal statutes." Id. at 735, quoted in 569
F.2d at 24.
84. 506 F.2d 83, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
85. 569 F.2d at 24. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1970) (perjury punishable by not
more than $2,000 fine or not more than five years imprisonment, or both); ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102 (A) (5) (a "lawyer shall not ...
knowingly make a false statement of law or fact").
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the prosecutor's testimony; 6 further, Briggs and his counsel had
been denied the procedural safeguard of cross-examination.8 7 Con-
sequently, the court concluded that some degree of prosecutorial
liability was necessary to "limit and contain the danger of abuse." 88
Judge Wilkey's dissenting opinion, which also focused on the dicho-
tomy of the prosecutor's role recognized by the Court in Imbler, deter-
mined that Goodwin's actions were as an officer before a judicial
body, not as a policeman in an extrajudicial arena.8 9 Because Imbler
suggested strongly that absolute immunity would be granted a prose-
cuting attorney whose advocacy activities related integrally to the judi-
cial process,9 0 Judge Wilkey maintained that Goodwin should be ac-
corded absolute immunityY1
Neither the majority nor the dissent critically discussed the specifi-
cation of the Imbler holding that "in initiating a prosecution and in
presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune." 92 Rather, each
opinion relied solely on the advocacy-investigatory distinction, and
both failed to extend their analyses to determine whether the prose-
cution had been initiated. The majority, however, noted that judicial
proceedings were ongoing and emphasized that "the timing of prose-
cutorial action, by itself, is not dispositive of the immunity issue," 93
but that 'the investigative function may embrace some acts even when
performed after the commencement of judicial proceedings." 94 Thus,
the court implicitly equated the initiation of the prosecution with the
implementation of judicial proceedings. Consequently, it based its
refusal to extend absolute immunity to Goodwin's testimony on its
conclusion that the general character of the proceedings was investi-
gatory.
The court's analysis cannot be reconciled logically with Imbler. As-
suming that the prosecution had been initiated in Briggs, the alleged
actions of the attorneys in the two cases not only occurred in sub-
stantially identical contexts but also produced similar results. In
Briggs Goodwin's alleged perjury led to the suppression of evidence
that deprived the accused of his constitutional rights. Likewise, in
86. 569 F.2d at 24.
87. Id. at 24-25.
88. Id. at 24 (quoting Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d at 93).
89. Id. at 42-46 (dissenting opinion).
90. 424 U.S. at 430.
91. 569 F.2d at 46 (dissenting opinion). Warning that "[j]urors, and then
judges, will doubtless be next," id. at 61, the dissent's reasoning also intimated
a self-serving purpose.
92. 424 U.S. at 431.




Imbler the prosecutor's alleged presentation of false testimony and
suppression of exculpatory evidence deprived Imbler of his constitu-
tional rights. Despite the similarity of Briggs to Imbler, however, the
District of Columbia Circuit's reasoning failed to follow the Supreme
Court's earlier holding. Instead, the court's tenuous analysis appeared
to be a post-hoc justification of its subjective decision to withhold
absolute immunity from Goodwin's in-court actions.
The court's analytical error in Briggs, however, did not cause it to
reach an improper result; it could have denied Goodwin absolute im-
munity on the ground that the prosecution had not actually been
initiated. The Supreme Court's distinction in Imbler between the
prosecutor's investigatory and quasi-judicial capacities is one useful
gauge of when a prosecution has been initiated. If, as in Briggs, the
primary function of the grand jury is investigative, the prosecution
will not have begun. Consequently, the attorney's actions should be
protected only by a qualified immunity. In the context of a grand jury
proceeding, Imbler should grant the prosecutor absolute immunity for
his in-court activities only when the focus of the proceedings has be-
come accusatorial. Under such circumstances, when the state is seek-
ing indictments for specific criminal activity, the prosecution has
been initiated, and absolute immunity should be extended.
Thus, the denial of absolute liability in Briggs appears to comport
with the standard in Imbler because Goodwin's testimony was given
before the initiation of the prosecution. If the grand jury proceedings
had become accusatorial, however, the prosecuting attorney's false
statements would have been accorded absolute immunity under Imbler.
This disparity of results, based solely on the stage of the prosecution,
cannot be explained by the rationale of absolute immunity. If the
policy of prosecutorial independence is an insufficient factor to re-
quire absolute immunity for an action occurring before the prosecu-
tion's initiation, then a substantially identical situation occurring
later in the proceedings should mandate a similar immunity determi-
nation.
THE IMBLER STANDARD: A RECONSIDERATION
Briggs represents the District of Columbia Circuit's conclusion that
Imbler does not permit a prosecutor, through his in-court activities,
to intentionally deprive an accused of his constitutional rights.95 The
Sixth Circuit, however, begrudgingly has accepted Imbler's extension
of absolute immunity from civil actions to prosecutors who violate
the constitutional guarantees of accused individuals 6 In his concur-
95. Id. at 20, 24-25.
96. Hilliard v. Williams, 540 F.2d 220, 221 (6th Cir. 1976).
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rence in Imbler, Justice White suggested reasons for this judicial
reluctance to accept the full import of the Court's holding: although
other measures designed to prevent a prosecutor from abusing his
authority may exist,1'7 violations may be difficult to detect; the threat
of a civil suit by an injured party often provides the only effective
deterrence.98 Consequently, a grant of prosecutorial immunity from
constitutional tort liability should be no more encompassing than is
necessary to reconcile the need for prosecutorial independence with
the remedial spirit of the Civil Rights Act.99
Rejecting the overinclusiveness of the Court's holding in Imbler,
Justice White proposed a more desirable standard for prosecutorial
immunity. As would the majority, he would grant absolute immunity
from civil liability to prosecutors for their decisions to initiate prose-
cutions and for their actions in presenting evidence to the court.10 0 Un-
like the majority, however, Justice White would not grant absolute
immunity to the prosecutor who suppressed evidence that he constitu-
tionally was required to disclose to the accused.10'
Justice White's proposal seeks to encourage maximum disclosure of
evidence to the Court.' -0 2 Presuming that the validity of the evidence
should be determined by the trier of fact, not by the attorney, 0 3 the
proposed standard grants the prosecutor absolute immunity from civil
liability for injuries resulting from his decision to present any
evidence.
In its rejection of Justice White's proposal, the majority correctly
concluded that the presentation of perjured testimony could injure
an accused as much as the suppression of exculpatory evidence, 0 4 and
that an act of perjury, which conceals important facts from the court,
often could be rephrased as an act of suppression. 0 5 Justice White
nevertheless believed that a prosecutor should be protected in his
97. See notes 84-88 supra & accompanying text.
98. 424 U.S. at 443-45 (White, J., concurring).
99. The Ninth Circuit in Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1968)
stated: "Section 1983 ... was intended to provide a remedy to persons subjected
to '[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law . . . .'" Id. at 536
(quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941)). See also Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 171-74 (1961).
100. 424 U.S. at 432, 440-41.
101. Id. at 433, 441. The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments require prosecutors to disclose material evidence favorable to an accused.
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107-114 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 86-88 (1963).
102. 424 U.S. at 442-43, 446-47 n.9.
103. Id.




decision to present perjured testimony; 106 lacking this assurance,
the attorney could be deterred from completely disclosing all pertinent
evidence at the trial. Consequently, a complaint alleging that the
prosecutor permitted the presentation of perjured testimony would be
insufficient to deprive the attorney of absolute immunity.
Justice White would require that a valid complaint assert that the
prosecutor knowingly suppressed specific evidence at the trial. 07
Thus, although an act of perjury may be related to an instance of
suppression, the perjured testimony itself should be a protected dis-
closure; the act of suppression, however, could subject the prosecutor
to liability. Indeed, in many situations, the prosecutor's suppression of
exculpatory evidence could be actionable regardless of the commission
of a connected perjury. If a .prosecutor fears that charges of suppres-
sion will arise from a witness's inaccurate testimony, he may protect
himself by disclosing to the court the basis for his misgivings as to the
witness's veracity. 0 8 Such a qualification clearly would be useful to
the fact-finder who must evaluate all of the evidence presented in the
case.1'09 Therefore, Justice White's proposal not only would eliminate
the unnecessary overinclusiveness of the majority's holding in Imbler;
by extending absolute immunity to prosecutors' disclosures, it also
would encourage them to present all the pertinent evidence in a case.
CONCLUSION
Recognizing the need to prevent abuses of conduct by prosecuting
attorneys, the court in Briggs v. Goodwin provided the prosecutor
with only a qualified immunity from liability for a deprivation of con-
stitutional rights resulting from his allegedly perjured testimony. Be-
cause the prosecution had not been initiated in Briggs, the result in
that opinion does not conflict with the Supreme Court's holding in
Imbler v. Packtman. The court in Briggs, however, failed to recognize
the importance of determining whether the prosecution had been
initiated; instead, its analysis reflected its reluctance to interpret
Imbler as granting absolute immunity to all of a prosecutor's in-court
activities. Thus, Briggs underscores the need for the Supreme Court
to reevaluate its holding in Imbler. To correct the defect of its present
holding, which is overly broad, the Court could adopt a standard
similar to that proposed by Justice White and extend absolute im-
munity to the presentation, but not the suppression, of evidence.
106. 424 U.S. at 440, 446 n.9 (White, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 441, 446 n.9, 447.
108. Courts could permit prosecutors to make such disclosures in the manner
least disruptive of the judicial process. See id. at 443 n.8.
109. Id. at 443.
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